[#2] The Balfour Declaration and the British Empire with Gerard Russell

GERARD RUSSELL: Britain did not rule the whole of India. Its authority was limited and partial, working through arrangements with certain princes and local kings who still retained influence in their domains. Over time, however, British control expanded steadily, as it absorbed more and more territories and states until it had fashioned what could reasonably be described as a vast semi-empire stretching across much of the Indian subcontinent.

HAMED AL GHAITHI: Here I am pointing specifically to the idea of the so-called white man’s burden. The belief that the white man was obliged to take responsibility for the wider world, guiding it, enlightening it, educating it, and generally assuming the role of its guardian and teacher, and so forth.

GERARD RUSSELL: So, you point to the ideas of Rudyard Kipling and to his well-known poetry. I believe this was an idea that emerged rather late in Britain’s history. By the end of the 19th century, British society had gone through a profound transformation. It had become notably more conservative, and there was a much stronger and more deliberate emphasis on religion, moral values, and ethical conduct. This shift developed gradually across the 19th century. I would argue that moral duty was never a central or driving factor in the calculations of the British government. There was, however, some public and political pressure to improve conditions in certain territories.

HAMED AL GHAITHI: The territories that Britain came to dominate in the Arab world and in West Asia, ranging from India to Egypt and extending to other regions as well. How exactly did Britain perceive these territories? Did it see them as a single, coherent bloc, a unified entity with a shared cultural and social structure that could be administered effectively from one central authority? Or did it instead view them as a collection of different lands and provinces, each distinct, varied, and requiring separate consideration?

GERARD RUSSELL: Britain was not really thinking primarily about the Jews or the Palestinians. Its main concern was France and the other European powers competing with it for influence. Britain did not want to allow France, or the Arabs for that matter, to gain control of these territories. Another key factor was oil. Britain had already discovered the immense strategic value of oil and knew that vast reserves existed in Iraq. Its ambition was to secure a pipeline running from northern Iraq to the Mediterranean Sea, which would give it both economic and strategic advantage.

HAMED AL GHAITHI: Welcome to a new episode of the podcast Metamorphosis with Hamed Al Ghiaithi. Our guest today our guest is the British historian and former diplomat Gerard Russell. Over the course of his career, Gerard served in a number of different regions as a diplomat, including Jerusalem, Iraq, Palestine, and Afghanistan, where he worked as part of missions that accompanied and operated alongside the British army in those countries. We are very pleased and honored to have you with us today, Gerard. Welcome.

GERARD RUSSELL: Hello, Hamed, thank you very much for giving me the opportunity to participate and be part of this conversation.

HAMED AL GHAITHI: Gerard, you possess extensive and detailed knowledge of the Middle East as a result of your many years of professional work and direct engagement in the region. You are also a seasoned diplomat who served within the British Foreign Office, and, in addition, you are a historian with deep insight into the area’s complexities.

You even authored an important book about the religious minorities of the Middle East, presenting them as a vital and integral part of the cultural and religious diversity of the region. What I would like to discuss with you today is the history of British foreign policy in the Middle East — how it shaped and influenced the region in the past, how it continues to affect it today, and what possibilities it might hold for the future.

So, let us begin our conversation. I believe that the United Kingdom first entered and established its presence in the Middle East during the 18th century. Why was that the case?

GERARD RUSSELL: First, let us step back a little to the period that came before this stage. Since the Middle Ages, Britain had been a kingdom geographically confined and deprived of the possibility of expanding by land, as it was an island.

After the island was unified under a single government, Britain began to look outward in search of opportunities abroad. To protect itself against the stronger continental powers of Europe, it built ships, and this naval preparation in the end led to Britain’s dominance at sea.

This superiority was possible because Britain was more advanced industrially, especially in the building of ships, and because it possessed abundant fuel resources — not oil at that time, of course, but coal — together with wood and the skilled craftsmanship necessary for ship construction. Thus, Britain became a true naval power, and that maritime strength produced further consequences, some of them arising almost by coincidence. The British sailed across the seas to all parts of the world — to Australia, to Canada, and to America.

Some went with the intention of settlement and colonization, others went to seek personal wealth and fortune, while still others entered into the service of local rulers in India and elsewhere. These rulers sometimes rewarded them with gifts of land, where they remained and established themselves.

Over time, the British government took notice of their presence and of these new territories, and it extended its authority over them. This was a long and gradual process, but by its end, Britain had become, in effect, the master of almost the entire Indian subcontinent. To supply its soldiers stationed in India and to bring valuable products back from India to Britain, the empire relied heavily on its shipping lanes. It sought, above all, to guarantee the safety and security of the trade route between the two countries.

The Gulf — whether called the Arabian Gulf or the Persian Gulf — lay directly on the route from India to Britain, and so it became of vital importance to London. The British wanted, first of all, to ensure that no other power could dominate this region, and secondly, to secure harbors and bases for their ships, particularly in Basra.

This, as you know, led to Britain establishing a permanent presence in the Gulf, where it fought against other states that were interested in the region and also against local inhabitants. I recall, for example, the battles against the Khawasim in Sharjah and Ras al Khaimah, which were aimed at securing control over this strategically essential area. There was also a smaller British presence in Iran, but what mattered most above all was India, and above all, the route that connected Britain to India.

HAMED AL GHAITHI: Thus, the driving force behind the construction of the British Empire — or what could be called the British Imperial Revival — was above all the pursuit of wealth. There was no underlying cultural or religious mission, no grand ambition to spread Christianity, nor a crusading effort to eliminate the so-called enemies of Christianity.

Instead, the logic was primarily commercial, rooted in trade and in the search for prosperity, resources, and riches that would strengthen Britain’s power and elevate its standing. In essence, the empire was not created out of lofty ideals, but out of the practical and pressing desire to secure material gain and economic advantage for Britain itself.

GERARD RUSSELL: Yes, and as I mentioned earlier, this was not confined to the Gulf but appeared in other regions as well. There were personal initiatives by individuals who sought to build wealth for themselves, often acting independently. For example, in Borneo, a British family — beginning with a single man who had been a military officer — traveled there and entered the service of the Sultan of Brunei. In return, the Sultan granted him a piece of land which his family ruled for three generations.

In time, this territory was considered part of the British Empire, though it had started as a private initiative and personal possession. Such ventures succeeded because these Britons could draw on Britain’s industrial strength, which gave them superiority over others in the region. They had advanced weaponry, more sophisticated than that of their rivals, and they were skilled in its use. These advantages secured dominance and turned individual ambitions into imperial possessions.

HAMED AL GHAITHI: The British Empire lasted for nearly two centuries. This raises the question: what kind of culture emerged in Britain during that long period, when it ruled almost three-fifths of the world? It was an empire spanning vast distances from North America and North Africa to Australia. Such expansion was commanded by a small island nation which, as I noted, had limited natural resources. Yet it harnessed the Industrial Revolution and the steam engine, gaining a decisive lead over other nations.

So, what culture developed among the British in this era? How did they see themselves amid global dominance? And what attitudes did they form toward the many peoples who lived under the authority of the British Empire? These questions reveal both Britain’s self-image as an imperial power and its perceptions of those subject to its rule.

GERARD RUSSELL: Yes, and surely there are those who know this subject better than I do, since social history is not my main expertise. Still, I believe the British felt a sense of pride in it.

Let me clarify. The term the British Empire, as far as I know, only began to be used in the mid-19th century. It was introduced by Benjamin Disraeli, who wanted to give a grander and more unifying title to Britain’s role abroad. But before that, it was not formally called an empire, but essentially the British trading company, which served as the main instrument of Britain’s presence and expansion overseas.

HAMED AL GHAITHI: And the company was listed on the London Stock?

GERARD RUSSELL: Yes, and as I mentioned, it was essentially a personal initiative, one that even maintained and commanded its own army in India, giving it both power and influence beyond what might be expected of a mere company.

At the beginning, Britain did not rule the whole of India. Its authority was limited and partial, working through arrangements with certain princes and local kings who still retained influence in their domains. Over time, however, British control expanded steadily, as it absorbed more and more territories and states until it had fashioned what could reasonably be described as a vast semi-empire stretching across much of the Indian subcontinent.

Following the great Indian uprising, known in English as the Indian Mutiny, the British government concluded that it would be far better to take over direct administration rather than leave such responsibility in the hands of a private trading company. A commercial enterprise, after all, could never govern or stabilize such an immense and diverse expanse of land. And so, the British government assumed the responsibilities of the company, consolidated its authority, and laid the foundations for what became a formal empire.

At that moment, Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli sought a grand and resonant title that would give the British people not only a sense of pride but also of dignity, power, and importance on the world stage. It was for this reason that the word empire came into common use and carried such symbolic weight. Indeed, there was pride among the people, though in reality, it was the elites, the wealthy families, and the upper ranks of society who were most invested in the imperial venture.

They were usually the ones who traveled overseas, particularly the younger sons of influential households. By tradition, the eldest son inherited the father’s estate, farmland, and responsibilities at home, while the younger sons had to search for employment, adventure, and opportunity elsewhere.

Many of them, driven by both ambition and necessity, went abroad to India, where they sought to carve out careers, build fortunes, and establish new lives under the expanding reach of the empire. In this way, the empire was not only a political and economic system, but also a social outlet for Britain’s upper classes, shaping destinies well beyond the British Isles. They went to America. They also went to other places, often to serve in the military and, more essentially, to earn a living.

In my view, it was these people who cared more directly about such matters, yet the broader public as a whole still felt pride in the existence of an empire, even though most of them had no real or tangible connection to those distant lands.

I’m not convinced that ordinary people gained very much from the empire. However, it did create jobs and provide employment in certain industries and in a few specific sectors of the economy. Jobs were created by the empire, especially in the export of clothing and textiles. And some people certainly benefited from this kind of work. Yet the majority of ordinary people never traveled abroad, and for that reason, they did not really know or understand much about the empire itself.

HAMED AL GHAITHI: This concerns the internal perspective within Britain regarding the empire. How did the British elite, and particularly the English elite, view the peoples and the countries that Britain had colonized and brought under its control?

Here I am pointing specifically to the idea of the so-called white man’s burden — the belief that the white man was obliged to take responsibility for the wider world, guiding it, enlightening it, educating it, and generally assuming the role of its guardian and teacher, and so forth.

GERARD RUSSELL: So, you point to the ideas of Rudyard Kipling and to his well-known poetry — works that gave voice to these notions and helped shape how they were understood and justified. I believe this was an idea that emerged rather late in Britain’s history.

By the end of the 19th century, British society had gone through a profound transformation. It had become notably more conservative, and there was a much stronger and more deliberate emphasis on religion, moral values, and ethical conduct.

This shift developed gradually across the 19th century, but it was in the final decades that one can most clearly observe a heightened concern with such issues — especially the promotion and spread of religion as a civilizing mission. I do not think this had been a significant motive before that period, and I also do not believe it was ever, in reality, a decisive factor for the British government itself.

Rather, it was something that existed more strongly among the public, shaping the attitudes of society at large. Among ordinary people, there grew an increasing preoccupation with moral questions and with the idea of duty — whether this was expressed in terms of spreading religion, promoting education, or disseminating culture. Some individuals genuinely sought to provide benefits and improvements to other peoples, although certainly not everyone shared this sense of obligation. As for the British government, it did not, at its core, treat the interests of other nations as a serious priority.

Its principal focus remained on immediate advantages — above all economic profit, political leverage, and the preservation of the empire’s dominance. I previously described these aims as short-term benefits, though perhaps that was not entirely fair, since the British elite of the late 19th century often thought in longer horizons than many governments do today, considering the endurance and stability of imperial rule.

Still, I would argue that moral duty was never a central or driving factor in the calculations of the British government. There was, however, some public and political pressure to improve conditions in certain territories — for instance, in India — where humanitarian appeals occasionally influenced policy. And it is undeniable that there were individuals who went to India and to other colonial territories and who, on a personal level, felt a sincere sense of responsibility and even compassion for the populations they encountered. There is no question about that.

Yet, at the governmental level, the picture looks different. I do not believe that governments in general devote serious concern to peoples beyond their own citizens, and this was equally the case for Britain at the height of its imperial power. The empire’s humanitarian veneer often concealed the reality that the preservation of power and the pursuit of advantage remained the primary guiding principles.

HAMED AL GHAITHI: On the level of policy, with regard to London’s policies toward the colonies — you mentioned earlier that the more distant territories were not really at the core of Britain’s developmental strategies, and of course that is understandable.

But what then was the actual vision of the government in London toward the lands it controlled? I am asking this question with in mind the territories that Britain came to dominate in the Arab world and in West Asia — ranging from India to Egypt and extending to other regions as well.

How exactly did Britain perceive these territories? Did it see them as a single, coherent bloc, a unified entity with a shared cultural and social structure that could be administered effectively from one central authority? Or did it instead view them as a collection of different lands and provinces, each distinct, varied, and requiring separate consideration?

GERARD RUSSELL: Let me distinguish between different periods of time. In the 19th century, especially in its early decades, there was not yet an empire in the full and formal sense.

What existed were almost individual initiatives, carried out by certain figures — some of them were little more than pirates, others were soldiers, and still others were traders pursuing their own ventures. Yet, as time went on, these scattered efforts gradually coalesced until, eventually, a genuine empire came into being. During that same period, the British people at home began to gain certain rights, such as the right to vote, which marked a stage of democratic development within Britain itself.

This meant that ordinary citizens now had a voice, and as a result, many different groups emerged with their own opinions — some of them religious in nature, others political — each offering distinct perspectives and visions.

By the end of that era, and moving into the 20th century, there were once again new positions, shifting moods, and changing ideas that reflected the evolving character of British politics and society.

To respond more directly to your question, the India Office or the Ministry of Indian Affairs oversaw matters not only in India but also at the same time in the Gulf. Alongside it, there were other important ministries such as the Colonial Office, as well as the Foreign Office, which played a different and complementary role in managing Britain’s global responsibilities.

And likewise, when we move into the period of the First World War, the British Army, too, played a highly significant role in administering and overseeing affairs — adding complication upon complication to an already complex situation.

There were also influential figures such as Evelyn Baring, who later became Lord Cromer and who, in practice — not in formal title — stood as the de facto ruler of Egypt. He was a wealthy man belonging to a prominent and affluent family of influence, and he exercised a decisive and far-reaching influence in shaping Britain’s policies toward Egypt and in managing its governance.

At that time, there was no single unified structure directing the entire empire. Instead, there were multiple ministries, departments, and individuals, each with their own authority. And this naturally led to grave and well-known problems, epitomized most clearly during the First World War.

A notable division existed between the India Office — which maintained direct connections with the House of Saud — and the British Army together with the war office in Egypt, which, in contrast, focused their attention much more heavily on Sharif Hussein. These overlapping jurisdictions, competing interests, and constant ambiguities created a multitude of difficulties and gave rise to many crises.

HAMED AL GHAITHI: Thus, the bureaucratic complexity within the British Empire was the main reason why a large part of the people in the region came to believe that Britain had made contradictory and conflicting promises. On the one hand, it pledged to Sharif Hussein that, following the conclusion of the Great War, an independent Arab state would be established in return for the Arabs joining Britain in its fight against the Ottoman Empire.

On the other hand, Britain extended another pledge to the Jews, promising them the creation of a national homeland in Palestine. When the war finally ended, the outcome was not the fulfillment of either promise, but rather the establishment of separate British mandate territories in Iraq and Palestine, along with a partitioning and redrawing of the region.

This entire historical episode left behind a deep impression — one that fostered a widespread conviction that Britain was not a trustworthy power and that its word could not be relied upon. So, the question remains: do you consider this opinion to hold any element of truth, or at least some justification that makes it understandable from the perspective of those who lived through it?

GERARD RUSSELL: Most people at the time recognized, as even Lawrence himself openly admitted, that Britain had failed to honor many of its commitments — particularly the promises extended to Sharif Hussein.

Yet, at the same time, it is also true that those who chose to align themselves as friends and allies of Britain during that war did, in fact, reap certain benefits, even if not all the pledges they had been given were ultimately fulfilled in practice. Britain, in its own way, felt a certain measure of responsibility toward these allies, attempting to provide them with something in return. But the undeniable and gravest loser of all was the Palestinian people.

They had never been granted any formal promises by Britain, and yet without question they emerged as those who bore the heaviest cost and endured the deepest loss as a direct consequence of Britain’s victory in the war. It is also worth remembering that, during the course of the conflict, Britain frequently found itself in moments of profound desperation — genuinely fearing at times that defeat was imminent and that the empire itself might collapse.

In such dire circumstances, it acted as it felt compelled to act in order to secure broader international support, particularly from the United States. The Balfour Declaration served precisely this purpose, functioning as a tool to attract American sympathy and political backing.

At the same time, however, there was an astonishing and even shocking degree of ignorance among British policymakers. Many of them did not grasp even the most basic distinctions between Sunni and Shia Muslims, and they entertained the naive belief that Prince Faisal could somehow be accepted by all Iraqis as a unifying monarch.

In reality, these officials had no prior experience whatsoever in Iraq and no understanding of the deep sectarian, religious, and social divisions that characterized the territories which would later constitute the modern Iraqi state. As a result, critical decisions of great consequence were being made in London by officials who lacked any genuine knowledge of the region and who had neither the time nor the inclination to stop, deliberate, or investigate carefully before acting.

Without doubt, alongside the obvious moral questions raised by their conduct, these officials committed grave and far-reaching errors in a number of important matters — errors that history has clearly laid bare and which it must be emphasized again cannot in any way be denied or overlooked.

HAMED AL GHAITHI: I…

GERARD RUSSELL: Sorry. I interrupted. Your question?

HAMED AL GHAITHI: Let me return once more to the subject of Palestine. As you were speaking about Iraq, a troubling question, or perhaps a problematic observation came to my mind, one I would like you to clarify. There is a widespread perception, particularly among Arab intellectuals and elites, and echoed in certain historical studies, that Britain deliberately contributed to the fragmentation of the region’s states, breaking them into small principalities and scattered emirates.

Later, when Britain finally withdrew in the 1970s, it left behind numerous border disputes and unresolved territorial issues, problems that justified the continued presence of foreign powers under the pretext of maintaining security. From this perspective, Britain is seen as having played a destructive, even sinister role in shaping the Middle East. That is one side of the argument. On the other hand, however, there are indications that complicate and at times contradict this interpretation.

You mentioned the role of Lord Cromer in Egypt, but it is also worth noting that he established, perhaps out of personal ambition or perhaps imperial duty, what could be described as a joint Egyptian-British realm in Sudan. Under his administration, Britain expanded outward, attaching those territories to Cairo as their administrative center. These regions remained under that arrangement even after Britain eventually withdrew from direct control in Egypt.

Another example is the unification of the three Ottoman provinces, Mosul, Basra, and Baghdad, into a single entity that became known as Iraq. From today’s perspective, this act seems less the product of a clear vision and more a reflection of limited understanding or even outright ignorance on the part of British bureaucrats in London. They did not truly grasp the complexities of the region, nor its history, its sectarian differences, or its social fabric. So, we are left between two views of Britain’s role.

On one hand, it is portrayed as harmful, leaving behind divisions and conflicts that endure to this day, consequences you know well. On the other hand, there were also attempts to create new states, though sometimes in ways that were artificial or unsustainable.

Iraq was unified but burdened with deep sectarian and ethnic tensions, while Egypt ultimately split into two states, Egypt and Sudan, under Gamal Abdel Nasser. Thus, the question that remains is: what, in reality, was Britain’s policy? Was it a deliberate strategy of fragmentation and dominance, or was it instead the unintended outcome of misunderstanding, improvisation, and decisions made far from the realities on the ground?

GERARD RUSSELL: Yes, as a matter of fact, I hold the opposite criticism of the British Empire. I believe Britain did not give enough attention to minorities and to smaller vulnerable groups within the region’s societies. These communities were often subjected to centralized authority imposed from above, whether from Baghdad or from another distant seat of rule. By overlooking their diversity and failing to address their needs, Britain left them under rigid systems of governance, which in turn fueled tensions and divisions that endured for many years afterward.

HAMED AL GHAITHI: And this is contrary to the French approach and the French colonial policy in the region.

GERARD RUSSELL: Yes, many of these minority communities at the time complained against the British, saying they had failed to adopt policies that might have safeguarded their interests or offered them protection. The Copts felt overlooked, and so too did the Yazidis and the Christian communities in northern Iraq.

The Assyrians of northern Iraq, in particular, were left to their fate. Without support or security guarantees, they suffered a massacre in the 1930s, an event that happened largely because the British authorities failed to act on their behalf.

That is to say, although Britain gave those peoples many promises, in the end it did not truly come to their aid nor fulfill its commitments. I personally believe that, especially toward the final chapter of the British Empire after the Second World War, London entertained the expectation that the governments which would arise in India and in the former colonies of the Crown would remain friendly, cordial, and aligned with Britain’s interests.

The British sought above all to remain strong and unified in the face of the looming communist threat. Thus, they desired to bring about a unified Indian state. India had historically been a mosaic of warring principalities, fractious and divided.

But by the time of the empire’s dissolution, Britain had overseen the emergence of a single Indian nation, despite the great rupture that created Pakistan. In reality, however, before partition, the land was even more fragmented and divided.

The same pattern can be observed in Malaysia and likewise in the Arabian Peninsula, where the disparate emirates were encouraged to come together into the United Arab Emirates. Indeed, Britain had originally even proposed that both Bahrain and Qatar should join in the same federal union. Yemen too was imagined in a similar framework.

In all these cases, Britain pressed for unity because it wanted these new states to be strong and centralized, for in Britain’s view, their governments were friendly to it, and strong allies were preferable. At the same time, London harbored deep anxieties about communism, about the possibility of coups, revolutions, and sudden upheavals.

From my perspective, I believe that most of the divisions and rivalries which later appeared were in fact already present at the very beginning. They were simply part of the natural condition of any human society.

In many parts of the world, a strong state ultimately compels people, even if reluctantly, to live under a single authority and to adopt the appearance of unity. In Britain itself this had long been the case, but in the Arab societies such enforced unity did not always materialize in the same way nor with the same permanence.

Therefore, in my modest opinion, this is the underlying reason. That said, I do not deny, nor can I recall in every detail, that at certain moments Britain may well have encouraged division when it served its advantage. That, of course, is always possible in the logic of imperial self-interest. Yet, overall, I do not believe Britain viewed fragmentation as to its benefit. On the contrary, what it wanted above all was to have allies who were strong, centralized, and reliable.

HAMED AL GHAITHI: The vision you outline is that British policy moved in step with existing realities, aligning itself with social and political forces while serving its own strategic aims. To that end, Britain created local administrations that managed affairs on the ground. Over time, these evolved into states, both in the Arab world and in India, which had long been divided into rival principalities.

When Britain withdrew, Pakistan and later Bangladesh emerged, while India remained as a largely unified state with a Hindu majority. Some even argue that both Indian identity and Hinduism as a unified religion were in large part British constructs, products of colonial governance that imposed unity over vast regions and grouped diverse beliefs under a single bureaucratic label.

GERARD RUSSELL: Some individuals genuinely believe that was the case.

HAMED AL GHAITHI: Let us return once more to the subject of Palestine, to what has become the enduring and central issue, the question of Israel and Palestine. You suggested that the Balfour Declaration came in the context of a desperate attempt by the British government to draw as many allies and supporters to its side as possible.

It was, in essence, a political gamble, one that could turn out to be successful or could just as easily fail. But the deeper question remains: on what moral or philosophical foundation could such a gamble rest? Was there truly any ethical justification at all? For in practice, Britain extended a solemn promise to another nation, to another religion, to another people of a different race. Yet it did so regarding a land already inhabited. It was not an empty space or a vacant desert, but a living country with its own people.

So, what reasoning guided Britain in making such a pledge? And, more importantly, what vision did it have for the Arab or Palestinian presence that already existed in that land? How did it imagine their rights, their place, and their future?

GERARD RUSSELL: As I said before, I am not here to defend the Balfour Declaration. My aim is not to justify it, but to explain the circumstances in which it was issued. First of all, it came in the midst of a world war.

The key point is that Britain then faced the very real possibility of defeat if it could not secure American assistance. The situation was extremely grave. Britain’s strength was stretched to the limit, and its survival as an empire depended heavily on whether the United States would support it.

The British government, therefore, regarded the Balfour Declaration as a tool to encourage American support. The idea was that a promise of a national home for the Jews in Palestine might influence opinion in the United States, especially among influential Jewish communities, and draw America more firmly into the Allied camp.

Yet, this was far from certain. America’s entry into the war could not be taken for granted. One must also recall that the United States had a long history of hostility toward Britain and toward the very notion of empire rooted in its own independence. In addition, America contained a large population of German descent, which further complicated the assumption that it would side with Britain.

From Britain’s perspective, the declaration was a gamble born of desperation, a measure taken in hopes of winning support that was not assured. Alongside this political calculation was the personal conviction of Arthur Balfour himself. He was a religious man who believed that the Jewish people deserved a homeland. His personal faith, combined with strategic concerns, shaped the declaration.

It should also be remembered that not all Jews supported it. Some English Jews objected. For instance, a Jewish minister opposed the declaration because he feared that creating a Jewish state would pressure Jews in Europe to emigrate there, weakening their position at home.

For this reason, he rejected both the idea of Israel and the Balfour Declaration itself. Thus, from the moment of its announcement, the declaration provoked controversy, not only among Arabs, but also within Britain and among Jews themselves. It was never a universally accepted policy, but a disputed one from the very beginning.

And, as I also mentioned, the British had no deep or genuine understanding of the Middle East. They possessed little real experience of the region, with only the most limited contact and in very specific circumstances, specifically in Egypt and to some extent the Gulf. Yet even in the Gulf at that time, the British had no real or substantial experience.

I cannot say with certainty what they were truly thinking, but it is important to recall that during the war nearly a million young Britons were killed, a staggering number that meant a very large portion of the nation had perished. The scale of the loss deeply scarred society and shaped the way Britain looked at the world.

In such desperate circumstances, people did not stop to reflect carefully or think far ahead about the future, nor did they concern themselves with the fate of peoples living in far-off regions. Their primary concern was survival. What mattered most was to find a way to endure and to bring the country safely through a bloody and destructive war that seemed to threaten everything.

You ask me about morality. Of course, Balfour had no right to give away the land of the Palestinians or of any other people. The land belonged to them, and the right of ownership was theirs alone.

The very notion that the homeland of one people could be promised or handed over to another was in itself illegitimate and unjust. It denied the basic rights of those already living on the land, as though their presence and claims could simply be disregarded. This is true to any other people, whoever they may be. The right to their land belongs to them alone.

This very notion, that the land of one people could be granted to another, seems to me an idea rooted in the age of empire, in the mentality of colonialism. It recalls what happened in America during the long campaigns of driving the Native Americans from one place to another, displacing them through conflict and war.

It is, in essence, almost the same theory and the same mindset that lay behind those policies. And it is the same spirit that motivated the author of the Balfour Declaration.

HAMED AL GHAITHI: Thank you very much for the clarification. I would like to ask another question in this context. Did the Balfour Declaration, after the war ended, become a binding policy for the British government? Or was it that events on the ground, including unfolding developments, began to shape policy and determine Britain’s stance?

Examples of events on the ground include the reality of Jewish immigration to Palestine, which began in the 19th century under Ottoman rule. This movement grew after the First World War and expanded even more significantly following the Second World War.

So, the question is, did the Balfour Declaration truly create a political commitment? Did it in effect place an obligation on Britain to adopt certain social and political policies in mandate Palestine, the territory then under direct British administration?

GERARD RUSSELL: It is said, for example, by the historian James Barr, who knows this period of history very well, that Balfour, and indeed Britain as a whole, wanted the Jews to act as Britain’s agents in Palestine. The reasoning, according to this view, was that the French would refuse or strongly oppose a British occupation of the Holy Land.

Britain therefore considered that the Jews could perhaps serve as intermediaries, as local agents who would administer and supervise Palestine, but always in close cooperation with Britain itself.

This also connects to a broader misconception often held in the West: the assumption that Arabs constantly think in terms of what the West is thinking, or that they place great importance on Western opinion of them. In fact, that is not true. Arabs, in many situations, are more concerned with what other Arabs think of them, with their own internal judgments, rather than Western ones.

In this particular case as well, Britain was not really thinking primarily about the Jews or the Palestinians. Its main concern was France and the other European powers competing with it for influence. Britain did not want to allow France, or the Arabs for that matter, to gain control of these territories.

Another key factor was oil. Britain had already discovered the immense strategic value of oil and knew that vast reserves existed in Iraq. Its ambition was to secure a pipeline running from northern Iraq to the Mediterranean Sea, which would give it both economic and strategic advantage. For this reason, too, Britain was unwilling to leave these lands in the hands of France or the Arabs.

Still, it does not appear that Britain was convinced it could hold onto the region forever. It was neither clear nor realistic to think so. As for the Balfour Declaration itself, it had been issued within a particular wartime context.

After the war, however, the British gained more experience and a deeper understanding of the actual situation on the ground. Over time, they began to regret the Balfour Declaration and aspects of their own policy.

In the 192s and 1930s, Britain did not actively encourage Jewish immigration. Naturally, this left the Jewish community deeply frustrated and disappointed. Once again, they felt that Britain had given a promise it failed to fulfill.

This frustration led to violent confrontations between Jews and British soldiers, as well as terrorist attacks against the British and those who cooperated with them. Among the most notorious incidents were the bombing and destruction of the King David Hotel in Jerusalem, along with other acts of violence.

In the end, Britain tried to maintain a balance between Arabs and Jews, attempting to satisfy both sides. Yet it failed completely in that effort and ended up angering and alienating both communities.

HAMED AL GHAITHI: Thank you very much for the detailed response. Nearly a century after those events and after Britain had helped shape the very outlines of the modern Middle East, Britain once again returned to Iraq and Afghanistan, this time under the banner of military and diplomatic missions. It re-entered these same lands in the form of new operations and renewed military involvement in regions where it had once been present in earlier times.

So, the question that arises is this: what had truly changed after all those years, and what remained the same in Britain’s role and presence in these places? As a Britain, both as a diplomat and a historian, you can reflect on this.

The British were present in these lands for a long time, they withdrew, and now they have returned. The question is, what has really changed in these societies? Have they, whether with Britain’s help or without it, managed to build states of their own and establish social and political systems that are just and stable?

Afghanistan and Iraq are only examples, but the question applies more broadly to the rest of the region, all of which in some way experience Britain’s presence and departure.

GERARD RUSSELL: The two cases are profoundly different from one another. Afghanistan is a country that has never truly experienced the presence of a strong and stable central government at any point in its history.

Even today, large numbers of Afghans live outside the effective authority of Kabul, dispersed across valleys, towns, and isolated regions, often cut off from one another, with significant ethnic divisions shaping their lives and loyalties.

The Uzbeks, for example, followed their own local leaders, and during the prolonged years of civil war, powerful warlords emerged who consolidated authority and commanded allegiance independently of any central state.

Iraq, by contrast, endured a long period of authoritarian and centralized rule. A large part of its people was compelled to serve in the internal intelligence services, spying on one another and living under constant surveillance. The state itself was built on suspicion, fear, and coercion, and its citizens became accustomed to the heavy hand of a strong central authority. This contrast demonstrates how radically different the two countries are in both their political traditions and their social fabric.

In Afghanistan, very little has changed across nearly 150 years. Since the British first set foot there, the patterns of fragmentation and decentralization have persisted with remarkable resilience.

By contrast, in Iraq, nearly everything has been transformed over time. And yet, despite the Iraqis’ long collective memory of past events, old divisions remain vivid, between Shia and Sunni, between Kurds and Arabs, and among other groups as well.

These divisions continued to mark the political life of the country and complicate any efforts at long-term stability. Britain itself, meanwhile, underwent deep changes, and so too did its global interests. One of the central reasons for Britain’s repeated failures in both Iraq and Afghanistan, in my view, was that its actual interests did not align with the policies it pursued on the ground.

At times, Britain adopted policies for political calculation or even moral justification, but they were not firmly rooted in its true strategic needs. This, I believe, was a fundamental mistake, because states can only be depended upon when they act in a way consistent with their own core interests.

If, however, a state follows a course that runs counter to its essential interests, then one cannot trust it to sustain that course for very long. For this reason, it is always wiser for nations to adopt steady interest-based policies, policies that ensure continuity, predictability, and reliability in the practice of foreign relations, and that allow others to believe in and rely upon their long-term commitments.

In international affairs, such consistency is often the most valuable form of strength a state can demonstrate.

HAMED AL GHAITHI: What then were Britain’s true and lasting interests in Iraq, in Afghanistan, and across the wider region as a whole? Interests that appear over time to have been set aside or neglected as British policy gradually drifted away from them or moved in quite different directions.

GERARD RUSSELL: There were no real interests to speak of.

HAMED AL GHAITHI: So, what then was the underlying reason and justification for Britain’s presence in those two countries?

GERARD RUSSELL: There were no real interests.

HAMED AL GHAITHI: That is to say, British policy moved away from them.

GERARD RUSSELL: There were no real interests. And for that reason, Britain’s presence in those two countries was a mistake.

HAMED AL GHAITHI: You have summarized it well. Thank you very much. Now I would like to turn to the future. At present, we are living through what feels like a pivotal and historic moment in the very structure and balance of the international system.

There is, on the one hand, the ongoing tragedy in Gaza, on the other, the Russian-Ukrainian war with all its global consequences. And added to this is President Trump, who has preoccupied the entire world with his sudden shifts, unpredictability and impulsive actions. In light of all these turbulent developments, do you believe that Britain still has a meaningful role to play in the world today? And if it does, what kind of role should that be?

GERARD RUSSELL: Yes, this is, of course, a personal opinion. I am not at all persuaded by the idea that Britain should continue to aspire to play a broad global role, because in my view it made grave mistakes in the past by joining the war in Iraq, and also by the way it engaged in Afghanistan.

I would not necessarily say that the initial intervention in Afghanistan was itself a mistake. At that moment, there were reasons to act. But the later attempt to impose the authority of Kabul across the entirety of the country was, in hindsight, a serious miscalculation. It ignored the realities on the ground, the nature of Afghan society, and the limits of outside influence. The result, as I see it, is that Britain’s ambition to play a global role has not been sustainable.

Britain today is far smaller and less influential than the world’s two dominant economies. The United States and China stand vastly above all others in scale and power, and no state, not even Britain with its long history, can hope to compete with them directly.

This imbalance makes a decisive difference and deeply affects the whole notion of Britain playing a truly global role. In my judgment, it would have been far more prudent for Britain to direct its energy and attention toward countries and regions it already understands well, where it has long established ties and tangible interests.

For example, focusing on building durable and mutually beneficial relationships with the Gulf states would have been a much wiser strategy than trying to intervene in Iraq, a country where Britain had no strong, friendly, or enduring historical connections to draw upon.

In my opinion, the idea of Britain genuinely playing a world-spanning role effectively ended more than eighty years ago. After the Second World War, Britain continued for a long time to behave as though it still possessed such a role, but in reality, this was more performance than substance.

The more realistic and beneficial path is for Britain to concentrate on specific parts of the world where stable, long-term partnerships can actually be cultivated. The Gulf region stands out in this regard.

It hosts significant British expatriate communities, has long-standing historical links with Britain, and is home to governments that, compared with much of the region, have maintained a greater degree of continuity and stability.

This relative stability creates opportunities to build relationships that not only benefit Britain but are also of genuine and lasting value to these Gulf governments, generating partnerships that can endure for decades.

Iraq, by contrast, has been far less dependable. I recall, for instance, that Britain was able to establish a good relationship with Ayad Allawi, yet he remained in office for only a single year before losing power.

The Gulf states, on the other hand, still have governments in place today that Britain has worked with for generations. This makes the effort to cultivate those ties far more stable, sustainable, and rewarding for both Britain and its partners, and a much wiser use of Britain’s limited resources in the contemporary international order.

HAMED AL GHAITHI: As both a historian and a diplomat, what is your vision for the future of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? In your view, what outcomes are realistically possible, and what would be the most ideal or desirable resolution to this long-standing struggle?

GERARD RUSSELL: Of course, the ideal solution? That part is easy. The ideal outcome would be a peace agreement that grants the Palestinians their own independent Palestinian state. I do not believe there is any realistic alternative to this.

Whether such a solution is still possible today, however, is another matter. When I was working in Jerusalem as a political officer 25 years ago, perhaps at that time it could have been achieved, but now, with the expansion of settlements and the changing realities on the ground, I am no longer sure.

Still, despite all the obstacles, that remains the only truly ideal solution. There are, of course, many other possible scenarios, but in my judgment, nearly all of them are negative, undesirable, or deeply unjust.

One possibility is that the situation may simply remain frozen as it is, without resolution. Yet I think it is more likely that Israel will continue to expand further at the expense of Palestinian land and simultaneously impose greater restrictions on the Palestinians themselves.

This would mean not only excluding them from the negotiating table but also denying them the most basic freedom of movement, preventing them from traveling between Jerusalem and Bethlehem or between Jerusalem and Gaza.

Over the decades, the daily life of Palestinians has grown significantly worse. In fact, compared with what I witnessed thirty years ago, their situation today has deteriorated profoundly, leaving them with fewer rights, less mobility, and greater hardship than before.

HAMED AL GHAITHI: Gerard, in my final question to you, with the accumulation of experience, study, and reflection, and with the many readings and lessons of history — what have you, as a historian, truly observed? Does history, in fact, repeat itself in recognizable ways? Do human beings, when faced with crucial choices, generally make wise decisions, or do they often falter?

And is it possible, in your judgment, for good outcomes to emerge from decisions and choices that were, from the outset, flawed or misguided?

GERARD RUSSELL: Of course, there has been significant technological progress, and it has been crucial in many different fields.

We should not only focus on the problems, the challenges, and the undeniable tragedies that still exist and that continue to remind us of the darker side of history. We must also remember that for most people around the world, life today is considerably better than what was possible a hundred years ago.

People now live longer lives, suffer from fewer diseases, and have benefited from countless technological innovations discovered and developed over the past century. Even prosperity and the chances for peace are greater now than they once were, offering opportunities that previous generations could hardly imagine.

There has also been some progress in the geopolitical realm, but it pales in comparison to the enormous advances in science and technology. Scientific progress has been extraordinary, yet politically we have repeatedly failed to create a better, more stable world.

My own conclusion is that when nations pursue the dream of building an ideal world and attempt to follow purely idealistic policies, the results can sometimes be worse than when they choose pragmatic policies grounded in real interests.

Realism, for all its shortcomings, allows for clarity and predictability, which are the foundations of stability. It may not inspire lofty visions, but it provides the consistency that societies and international partners need.

The most important thing in international relations is that a state’s behavior should be clear and consistent, something others can depend on. People need to know what is happening and be able to anticipate future developments.

Lack of clarity, on the other hand, often leads directly to conflict and even war. It is always better when things are understood in advance. For instance, what would happen if Russia invaded Ukraine? What would happen if settlements continued to be built on Palestinian land? Such clarity helps both allies and rivals calculate their actions and prepare for consequences.

This is not to say that I oppose the pursuit of international legitimacy or legal principles. Yet, when we look at policies such as the war in Iraq, I am convinced it would have been far better if they had been founded on a clear understanding of real interests.

That would have provided the Iraqis, as well as the rest of the world, with a more accurate idea of what was happening and what was likely to follow.

When governments act without a solid foundation of interest or clarity, they may appear decisive in the short term, but in the end, I believe they are destined to fail. And history has shown us this pattern time and again.

HAMED AL GHAITHI: Thank you very much, Gerard. I appreciate your time and the insights you shared.

GERARD RUSSELL: Thank you, thank you, Hamed. And I must apologize for the linguistic slips and the language difficulties that occurred along the way.

HAMED AL GHAITHI: Your Arabic is actually better than my own. Thank you very much for your time.