[#5] October 7 and the Middle East’s Future with Amos Yadlin

INTRODUCTION

HAMED AL GHAITHI: Welcome to a new episode of Metamorphosis. I'm your host, Hamed Al Ghaithi. Today I'm honored to welcome a man who has spent four decades at the very top of Israel's spear. Amos Yadlin, former chief of Israel military intelligence, Aman, the pilot who participated in the 1981 F-16 strike that destroyed Saddam Hussein's Osirak reactor, and the mission planner who helped take out Syria's secret Al-Kibar nuclear site in 2007. He has worn three uniforms. First, as a decorated fighter pilot with more than 5,000 hours in the cockpit. Then as Israel's military attaché to Washington, and later as the intelligence chief who briefed every prime minister from Sharon to Netanyahu. When he hung up the uniform, he did not slow down. Harvard's Kennedy School, director of Israel's premier strategic think tank, INSS, and still the phone that rings when Jerusalem needs to game out war, peace, or anything in between. From the cockpit over Baghdad to the situation rooms of Tehran, Doha, Damascus, General Yadlin has seen the Middle East's map redrawn in real time. Few people have witnessed, shaped, and analyzed the region's strategic shifts with the depth and clarity of Amos Yadlin. Today on Metamorphosis, we ask him what the next lines on that map will look like and whether the region is heading for new order or new chaos. But before we start, I need to mention that this interview is a tribute to the professor of International Security Studies, Richard Schultz of the Fletcher School, who introduced me to General Yadlin and who taught me always to widen my horizon. General, welcome to the show.

AMOS YADLIN: Thank you, Hamed. And also on this side of the ocean, we were very saddened to hear about the passing of Professor Richard Schultz. Please accept my deepest condolences for the loss of the Fletcher School and everyone who was his student and his friend.

HAMED AL GHAITHI: Thank you very much. And those students were many, many of them, some of them in Israel and across the whole world. Thank you very much.

OCTOBER 7TH: A TRILATERAL FAILURE

HAMED AL GHAITHI: General Yadlin, looking back at October 7th, 2023, what was it — a failure of intelligence or a failure of political will to act on the intelligence that existed?

AMOS YADLIN: It was a trilateral failure, not only intelligence, not only political. It started from intelligence, but it went all the way up into an operational failure and political failure. If we want to look at each one of them, the intelligence was mistaken on Hamas's intentions. They thought that Hamas was deterred, and it wasn't. And they also didn't understand the capabilities, not only the intentions. When you are head of intelligence, when you have good sources, you know what are the enemy's capabilities. How many missiles, what is the range, what is the tonnage of the warhead. Intentions are much more difficult because it's in the head of a leader that can start a war. So the intelligence failed on both. The operational — Southern Command of the IDF failed on stopping Hamas because they needed to be ready to stop Hamas even if there is no early warning, if there is no intelligence coming to them. They have to have enough forces and enough capability to deal with Hamas even if the intelligence fails. And the political failure has to do with the government of Netanyahu that preferred to deal with Hamas because Hamas was not a partner for negotiation, and transferred Qatari money to Hamas — a lot of millions of dollars — that enabled Hamas to build their military might. And also, before the 7th of October attack, a judicial reform or judicial revolution basically split the Israeli public and gave our enemy the idea that maybe Israel is now weakened and maybe this is the right time to attack it.

ASSESSING ISRAEL'S POSITION: VICTORY OR QUAGMIRE?

HAMED AL GHAITHI: Thank you very much. And now at this point of time, end of 2025, Hamas's top leadership has been eliminated in Gaza, in Tehran, and maybe other places — who knows. Do you believe that Israel is closer to victory or it's entering a new quagmire with no clear exit?

AMOS YADLIN: I think Israel's position, strategic and military position, vis-à-vis all its enemies — because the war was not only against Hamas. The war was against seven fronts that were supported by Iran. Hamas attacked Israel on the 7th. On the 8th, it was Hezbollah, and then later on, Shia militia from Iraq, Iranian forces from Syria, Iran itself, the Houthis, terror from the West Bank. So the level of victory is different in each one of the fronts. By the way, victory is not the right term. The term that I prefer, because there is no absolute victory in the 21st century, not even in the 20th century since World War Two — maybe you can define a victory as being able to achieve the objectives of the war that are set by the political level. What happened in Gaza, however, is that the political level set the bar very, very high. They called it absolute victory. And absolute victory — Israel was unable to achieve absolute victory in Gaza because of four issues. The hostages that we care a lot about their life. The fact that Hamas surprised us, not only with the 7th of October attack, but with a network of tunnels well equipped with air, with energy, with doors to stop any attacks. And then the fact that Hamas was willing to sacrifice their innocent people by putting their command posts under schools, hospitals, UN positions. And the fact that this is the only war in the world that Israel was forced to give its enemy all its needs — food, fuel, energy, everything. So absolute victory was not a capability in Gaza. However, Hamas was defeated, as you just said. Israel's security is now much better than it was on the 6th of October. Hamas cannot repeat the massacre of the 7th of October again. Israel in a way is now controlling half of the Gaza Strip. And we are looking into the 20-point plan of President Trump. Which kind of scenario will develop from this plan, which is not well defined. We'll come to this point later to discuss it further.

THE INTELLIGENCE CULTURE: LESSONS AND WHAT COULD HAVE BEEN DIFFERENT

HAMED AL GHAITHI: You've been intelligence chief. So if you were in the office in 2023, what would you have done differently in the weeks before the attack?

AMOS YADLIN: It's not an issue of a week. It's an issue of years. I think it's an issue of culture. When you are in intelligence, you always have to assume that you don't know everything, that there is something that you don't know, and there is something that even you don't know that you don't know. And I'm quoting Rumsfeld. So the culture that I encouraged when I was five years head of intelligence is the culture that anybody in the organization can write me and say, "Sir, we know that you are very experienced and very smart. However, we see and think differently than you. And please look at it." And I did a lot of discussions and meetings to look at hypotheses that people in the rank of corporal or lieutenant brought up to the general. So this is culture. And when I say it's not an issue of days or weeks — the plan of Hamas, how to attack Israel, was in hand. Israel achieved it. Israel collected it as a plan, first time in 2018 and then in 2022. But nobody believed that this is a real plan. And this is exactly what intelligence should not be — with a concept that they stick to, and now everything that's happening, they have to fit into the concept that Hamas is deterred and Hamas will never dare to attack a stronger force like Israel. And this is the big mistake.

HAMED AL GHAITHI: So basically, there were certain biases in the Israeli intelligence community that flourished for a long time and it was not corrected.

AMOS YADLIN: Absolutely. And this is fatal, I tell you, and you know it more than I do. I think there are in history another three very important events like that. It's Pearl Harbor, 1941, that the US hadn't understood what the Japanese wanted to do, and they had some information, but due to bias and wrong concept, they hadn't looked at it. And then Barbarossa attack, the Nazi attack on the Soviet Union, and then Yom Kippur War. And you can add even September 11th to that. So we have to learn from history and we have to find mechanisms that it will not happen again. And it's an issue of culture, culture and the right organization.

HAMED AL GHAITHI: I totally agree with you. I mean, this extends also not only to intelligence, but also in organizations in general and the business world.

THE GAZA CEASEFIRE: PEACE PLAN OR TACTICAL PAUSE?

HAMED AL GHAITHI: You mentioned the peace plan in Gaza, and you know, now hostages are being released and it's being implemented, at least phase one. And I want to ask you, like, being an Israeli former intelligence officer, do you believe this is a genuine peace plan or is it a pause that Hamas will use to rearm? And also, like, within Israel, does the Israeli far-right cabinet really have the intention to torpedo this plan? So, no peace in the medium to long horizon — it's just like a pause for all parties involved.

AMOS YADLIN: Yeah, peace is another issue. I don't think that peace is on the agenda. But ending the war in a way that President Trump wants to end it — it is on the agenda. I see three scenarios, by the way. One is Hamas accepting the fact that demilitarization of Gaza and laying down its arms is part of the plan. They haven't recognized it yet because the plan is in a way ambivalent and vague in the terms. And when Hamas said, "We agree to it," they say, "Yes, but..." But the president decided that they accepted the plan. So one scenario is that Hamas understood the disaster they brought about Gaza, and they will lay down their arms. They will stay maybe as a political party and maybe try to be in the model of Hezbollah in Lebanon with some arms under a legitimate government. This is one. In this case, Gaza will be reconstructed and it will be the closest we can think about joining — being in a peace situation. On the other spectrum is Hamas refuses to disarm. President Trump, seeing that Hamas is going against his plan and basically giving Israel a green light to continue with the war. This time, there are no hostages in Gaza. This time Israel, I hope, has better techno-operational methods on how to deal with the tunnels. And it will be a continuation of the war. It has nothing to do with the extreme right-wingers in Israel. This is a consensus in Israel — that if Hamas is not dismantling and not laying down their arms and continues to be a terror on our border, Israel will not allow it. And there is a scenario in the middle. Gaza is now divided by the yellow line. East Gaza is a terror-free area, and there are people who think, especially in the Trump administration, that they will do the reconstruction only in the terror-free areas, which is basically East Gaza. West Gaza will be controlled by Hamas. Nothing will be rebuilt there. And Hamas will have to live in the ruins of Gaza. It may remind you of West Germany after World War Two, but the directions are 180 degrees different. I don't think it's sustainable, but I think for a period, for the short run, maybe a medium run, if Hamas is not dismantling, this is the scenario that President Trump would like to see.

HAMED AL GHAITHI: What are the probabilities you give to each of these scenarios?

AMOS YADLIN: I used to give the first one only 10 percent. I'm taking it up a little bit because it seems to me that Hamas finally understood what a disaster it brought about the people of Gaza. And the people of Gaza are now saying to Hamas, "It's time to rebuild the Gaza Strip, stop the war." I'm giving the medium — West Gaza, East Gaza — about 40 percent, and the possibility of renewing the war another 40 percent. So 20, 40, 40. I don't think that personally — this is from my understanding of Hamas and reading — I don't think that they will give up their arms. So unless, you know, God happens in mysterious ways, I think it's not possible.

HAMED AL GHAITHI: Brilliant. Let's wait and see.

AMOS YADLIN: Yeah, let's wait and see. Exactly.

THE IRAN STRIKE: DEGRADATION OR DELAY?

HAMED AL GHAITHI: Let's switch gears to another big front that Israel had this year. In June 2025, Israel attacked Iran — massive preemptive strike as labeled by Israel on nuclear and military sites in Iran. And I'm not going to talk about the details about it, but I want to ask you from a strategic perspective, do you believe that Israel has significantly degraded Iran's nuclear and ballistic capability or just delayed it?

AMOS YADLIN: It is both. It is both. As I said, there is no anymore absolute victory or total destruction, especially of a country which has no border with you, which is far away, and it's a huge country. The Iranian nuclear program was rolled back, not weeks, not months, years. And it's now up to the Iranian decision whether they are going to go back to the same place. It will take years, and there are two possibilities here. One, that there will be an agreement that will stop them far away from the threshold where they have been before the attack. And second, that if they will come closer to the same place, that the US and Israel will do it again. On the ballistic missiles, they lost half of their force — missiles and launchers — and no doubt that they will try to rebuild this force. But once again, it is not taking months, it will take some time.

HAMED AL GHAITHI: Okay, I mean, regarding the attack and its main target. The target was of course the nuclear site. Some reports say — we know Israel, Iran had roughly 400 kilograms of enriched uranium shortly before the attack. Some reports say it's buried, and in the sense that Iran cannot retrieve it and extract it. And some people believe it's just underground, it cannot be retrieved. And of course, Iranian media said that they retrieved it and it's distributed throughout the country. So the question is, how do you assess the impact of the Israeli-American strikes on Iran in light of its main target, the uranium? If it's intact and in the hands of Iran, how effective do you see the campaign itself?

AMOS YADLIN: You cannot make a nuclear bomb only from enriched uranium, even if it is 60 percent. You need more centrifuges, most of which were destroyed. You need to do the conversion from gas to metal. You have to incorporate it into the warhead. It is a very complicated program that most of its ingredients, most of its scientists, most of its sites were destroyed. So you're absolutely right that maybe the 400 kilograms of enriched uranium will be retrieved by the Iranians. But once again, what the Israeli and the American and the European intelligence will look at is whether they are rebuilding the sites and the capabilities to take this fissile material and convert it into a bomb.

HAMED AL GHAITHI: Okay. Another question on the Iran attack. Was it a strike on the nuclear capability of Iran, or was it a strategic message to Tehran and its allies, the Ring of Fire? So what was on the top of Israeli strategic calculus?

AMOS YADLIN: Yeah, I think you touch on a very important issue, because on one hand, as we discussed in the previous question, it was a preemptive attack. This is an old Israeli doctrine named after Prime Minister Begin, that in 1981, he saw Saddam Hussein speaking about destroying Israel and developing a nuclear bomb. So he decided to preempt and to attack this nuclear facility near Baghdad. The same was exercised by Prime Minister Olmert vis-à-vis a North Korean nuclear reactor that was found in the desert, in the Syrian desert, with no scientific or medical or any energy purpose, only to produce plutonium for a bomb. And when Israel saw that Iran has a lot of fissile material and a lot of activities are starting on weaponization, the preemptive part of the attack was there. But there was another part of the attack which was the strategic retaliation for Iran being behind the seven fronts, giving them money, giving them weapons, terror capabilities, training, even ideology. And the fact that Iran attacked Israel brutally twice during the war, in April 2024 with 300 ballistic missiles, drones, cruise missiles, and then again in October with 200 ballistic missiles. For the first time, by the way, the shadow war between Israel and Iran became a direct attack on Israel, and Israel had to retaliate. So it was prevention and retaliation at the same time.

THE QATAR STRIKE: STRATEGIC CALCULUS OR TACTICAL MISTAKE?

HAMED AL GHAITHI: Okay, let's switch gears again to another strike that Israel conducted this year, and I see that Israel was very busy this year. I mean, in the last couple of years. Qatar. So, September 9th, Israel attacks for the first time a Gulf country. And I come from Oman, so I know the sentiment and I know this pokes a lot of fears in the region. It will not be cured quickly. I want to ask you, what is the strategic thinking behind targeting Hamas leaders in Qatar while discussing a peace plan presented by the Americans? It's crazy.

AMOS YADLIN: Okay. Israel is much more aggressive since the 7th of October because we have learned the lesson. We were restrained, we looked for legitimacy, and we let our enemies build divisions of terror fighters on our border. So this will not happen again. Israel changed the defense concept. Instead of waiting for the enemy to attack us, we decided this time when it's needed, Israel will preempt. With Hamas, Hamas launched a very devastating, cruel attack on Israel, not only on the Israeli military, but mostly on Israeli civilians — killing 900 women, children, beheading them, burning them, raping them. Israel decided that these criminals will be removed as much as we can. By the way, we speak about the Begin Doctrine. This was the Golda Meir Doctrine. After the Olympic attack on our participants in Munich in '72, she decided that anybody who took part in it will be eliminated. So Khalil al-Hayya was one of the few that were left alive, and Israel wanted to eliminate him as well. After saying that — a justified attack — I fully agree with you that it was not the right time, it was not the right method. The right time was not, because at that time this terror leader was considering President Trump's offer, and it wasn't the right method. Attacking Qatar with ballistic missiles or whatever kind of missile it was — was not a good idea. That's why you have Mossad for. That's why you have clandestine and covert operations. And so, bad timing, bad method. But the idea that Khalil al-Hayya should not exist is still right.

HAMED AL GHAITHI: And talking about Khalil Hayya, you cracked me up laughing when you gave the lecture here in Fletcher when you translated his name to English, Khalil the Snake. That was — so anyway, but I think the strike on Qatar at that time and the method — I'm not talking about the target, legitimate or not — but the method was very disturbing. That's my opinion, personal opinion.

AMOS YADLIN: Hamed, let me emphasize two points.

HAMED AL GHAITHI: Yeah, sure.

AMOS YADLIN: Qatar hosted terrorist leaders for years. Qatar gave a lot of money to Hamas and enabled them to build the terror machine that they operated against Israel. Qatar is also supporting every anti-Israeli activity in the world. So I'm not feeling a lot of sympathy to Qatar. Second point, even though the attack was not justified as we agreed, and even though it was not an operational success, at the end of the day, it brought the peace to Gaza. It brought the end of the war. Because finally, Qatar understood that they have to push Hamas and they have to push them to bring back all the hostages. And I can tell you, if Hamas was willing to bring back all the hostages, we could have saved a year or even more of this awful war. And the people of Gaza would be saved. But Hamas refused to do it. And this is why we went all the way to two years of war that was really unjustified and not needed.

HAMED AL GHAITHI: I mean, I totally agree with you. I mean, I haven't defended Hamas throughout my life and I won't. I actually criticize them a lot, disagree with them. And the way, I mean, starting the attack in the first place, like October 7th was crazy. I think crazy, man, like Barbarossa — you will go Barbarossa into Russia. Napoleon did it, didn't work, and they should have learned. It was unjustified not only morally, but also on strategic thinking. So yeah, but with the issue of Qatar, I think we can have a disagreement there. But let's focus on — so the attack on Qatar happened. Israel attacked Qatar planning to or intending to kill Khalil Hayya. And what happened is unintended consequences which you alluded to. So peace plan happened, but also the damage that Israel sustained to its reputation, even within the US — fierce repercussions. Would you think, I mean, if you were making the decision instead of Netanyahu, having these in mind — I'm pretty sure you would have calculated for that — would you see that attack necessary or too much of a price to pay for Khalil al-Hayya?

AMOS YADLIN: I said already, it was a mistake. There is a lot of concern in Israel about the threats. We are much more sensitive than before. However, some of the Israeli activities are well justified. For example, Hezbollah. Hezbollah was our main enemy. They have 3,000 missiles aimed at Tel Aviv and all strategic areas in Israel. And they started the war on the 8th of October, supporting Hamas. So attacking Hezbollah is very justified, highly justified. So is the attack on Iran. However, I'm not agreeing with our policy in Syria, which — we have a very strong line, the 1974 line, according to the disengagement that Henry Kissinger brokered between Israel and Syria. And I don't see the need to have any military confrontation with Syria as long as the Syrian regime is not becoming hostile to Israel actively. And I don't like the attack on Qatar. Even though I said the Qataris deserve this attack, but it was not the right move from Israel because it gives some people in the Middle East a new idea that Israel is now out of control and they are threatening the stability in the Middle East.

ISRAEL'S STRATEGIC VISION: SECURITY, NOT EXPANSION

AMOS YADLIN: A prime minister in Israel should say that we are not looking for Greater Israel. We are not looking for any territory. We're looking only for security and we're using our force against those who prepare another 7th of October or another Holocaust for us, but not more than that. On the contrary, we want to shape the Middle East into a stable region, into a region that has peace between the nations and the states, and I think we have a very good opportunity here.

HAMED AL GHAITHI: I mean, now you touched on Syria and Greater Israel, and I'm pretty sure you know this, but I need to say it for the audience as well. Think tanks in the West, but also a lot of people in the Middle East that I know and I read, they truly believe that Israel wants hegemony in the region and Israel seeks Greater Israel. So expansion and taking more lands, especially in Syria and Southern Lebanon. And just a few days ago, there is another incident that happened like Israeli in Syria. You know it, so I'm not going to go into the details.

AMOS YADLIN: So, once again, I don't think that Israel is looking for any territorial expansion. Israel is caring only about its security. What it's negotiated with al-Sharaa in Syria is a security agreement that is based on the fact that southern Syria will be demilitarized, so it will not be a threat to Israel. What we see in southern Syria is Jamaat Islamiya. It's an Iranian-backed Sunni terrorist group that wanted to attack Israel. We heard this week from the Minister of Defense that the Houthis are sending forces to attack Israel from the Golan. So it's only security. If Israel will negotiate a security agreement with Syria — and it is now stuck on the issue of humanitarian corridor to Swaida, to the Druze in Syria — and once again, we don't want any territorial corridor. We want a conceptual corridor that is needed to bring humanitarian help to this minority that unfortunately went through a 7th of October of their own. And they haven't defeated their enemies as we did with Hamas. In Lebanon, the day Hezbollah will disarm, Israel will respect every inch of Lebanon, every inch. And it is only in five small hills that look into an Israeli settlement, Israeli town, Israeli city. So whenever Hezbollah will not be south of the Litani River, I think Israel will hand back these five places to Lebanon. The problem, however, is that the Lebanese army is not efficient in dismantling — Hamas and Iran sending Hamas — Hezbollah.

HAMED AL GHAITHI: Hezbollah, Hezbollah.

AMOS YADLIN: Hezbollah. And Iran is trying to rebuild Hezbollah. And so Israel will have to continue with its attacks on Hezbollah, which is a justified attack, unlike what I said, attacks in other places that are not always justified.

QATAR AS A BROKER: NEUTRAL OR COMPLICIT?

HAMED AL GHAITHI: Okay, very clear. One question I want to — I mean, I have in mind about Qatar. Qatar has been a broker between Israel and Hamas. And they do a lot of brokering between lots of things, lots of people, which is weird a little bit, but nevertheless. So do you think that — I mean, how does Israel perceive Qatar now, after, especially after the attack on Qatar? Do you see Qatar as a neutral broker or would Israel not accept Qatar as a broker whatsoever, whether neutral or not neutral? So what is the relationship, future relationship between Qatar and Israel?

AMOS YADLIN: Thank you for saying neutral and not honest broker. Qatar is not neutral and Qatar is not honest. Qatar is supporting the terror organization called Hamas. And they supported Hamas before the 7th of October attack, and they supported them during the war, and until the attack, they haven't pushed them to end the war. So we don't see them as a broker. If we need a broker with Hamas, it will be Egypt, much more respected in Israel. It may be even Turkey. But mostly, most of the people in Israel who are not getting some money from Qatar are against seeing Qatar as a broker.

HAMED AL GHAITHI: Okay. So will the Israeli government stop dealing with Qatar regarding Hamas and the Palestinian issue, or like just sentiments you keep in your heart, but you have to deal with them, especially because the Americans now rely on them a lot.

AMOS YADLIN: I don't think that Qatar is that important. We have very good relations with the UAE, who also care about the Palestinians, but they are not supporting terror organizations. I hope we will have a good relation with the Saudis who also care for the Palestinians, but not supporting the terror organization Hamas. If Qatar will come to President Trump and will say we want to join the Abraham Accords, I think Israel will consider it as a positive move and will reciprocate. But at this point when Qatar is encouraging BDS against Israel, demonstrations against Israel and supporting the terror organization Hamas and hosting their leaders, we don't see any need to get close to Qatar. There are much more moderate, modern, pro-Western countries that we can deal with in the Gulf and not this small country. With all due respect, it's a quarter of a million people who are controlling another eight or even more foreign workers. And with all its attempt to become an international player, they are playing a negative role by now.

THE MIDDLE EAST LANDSCAPE: WINNERS, LOSERS, AND THE PATH FORWARD

HAMED AL GHAITHI: We'll shift again to the last topic in our interview today. As a strategic practitioner, how do you assess the landscape in the Middle East after the two years with all the wars that we just talked about? Who are the winners, losers, and countries on the fence, not knowing their futures? What is your assessment?

AMOS YADLIN: Hamed, let's do it — the last question. And I think the losers are very clear, very clear. It's Iran, it's Hezbollah, the Assad regime, and I think maybe Hamas as well. This is the losers. In a way, the extreme enemies of Israel are now in a worse situation, much weaker than they were. The winners — the United States of America, after more than two decades that they had very unsuccessful wars in the Middle East with a lot of treasure and blood, and they haven't achieved their goals and their objectives. The US is now seen in the Middle East as a reliable ally which helped its ally Israel, and a country that attacked for the first time a rogue state with a nuclear bomb — with a nuclear — that tried to develop a nuclear bomb. So you see that President Trump is enjoying very good relations with the Saudis, with the Emiratis, with the Qataris, with the Syrian president. So the US is no doubt a winner. Because the other winner is Israel, but Israel paid a high price — high price, both on the 7th of October — almost 2,000 people and soldiers that were killed in this war — economic burden and diplomatic failure. The diplomatic standing of Israel is now much lower than it was. So Israel is a winner with a high price, the US is a winner with a very low cost. Turkey is also a winner. They got rid of the Iranians in Syria. They are now much stronger against the Kurds, and they have an ally in Damascus. So what we see basically is five superpowers now in the Middle East. None of them is dominant, and they will have to find the right balance. It's Turkey, Iran, Israel, the Saudis and the Egyptians. But above all, the US is now back to the Middle East, or let's say they never disengaged. And Russia belongs to the losers because their main country, their main ally Syria, is not anymore an ally. It is now an ally of the United States. And China in a way was not important in this two-year war. So great power competition, the Americans got some points.

A NEW REGIONAL ORDER? THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION AND FUTURE STABILITY

HAMED AL GHAITHI: Yeah, I think I agree with this assessment. So you have winners and losers. For the future, if the gains are not secured in agreements, security arrangements, formal ones, then all these gains will be very fleeting. And you know that the landscape, especially in the Middle East, changes very quickly. So, thinking about the future, do you think that some sort of new order in this region could emerge that gives security, security guarantees to all these players? And also gives the Palestinians — we purposefully, I didn't talk about the Palestinians today or the Palestinian issue. But also any future arrangement in the Middle East that makes it stable, I think should address the Palestinian issue. So, do you think that this is possible to emerge?

AMOS YADLIN: I think the chances are there. The chances are there. After every war, people are recalculating and repositioning themselves in a different aspect after they learn the lesson of the cost of war. I was a young pilot in the Yom Kippur War. And this was the fifth war between Israel and Egypt. And nobody thought that after five years, or maybe four years, President Sadat would come with an airplane to Israel and would speak in the Knesset. So, if there will be different thinking in the Palestinian people, especially Hamas, who is unfortunately enjoying the majority of the Palestinians who are against any peace with Israel. What these idiots are calling in the street? From the river to the sea. What's the meaning of "from the river to the sea"? It's not a two-state solution. It's the end and the destruction of the State of Israel. So you need to prepare both sides for a different attitude to bring peace and stability. I hope in Israel there will be an election next year. I hope that this government, extreme right-wing government, will not be there. And we will have a leadership that will be willing to test the willingness of the Palestinians to have a political arrangement. It didn't happen with Rabin, with Barak, who were center-left. The Palestinians rejected any proposal, but maybe after this war that was traumatic not only to Israelis, to the Palestinians in Gaza for sure, and maybe all over, that we will look into different leaderships on both sides with the support of the Arab world, of the Gulf states, of the United States of America, of Europe, towards a stable and peaceful Middle East.

ISRAELI POLITICS AND NETANYAHU'S FUTURE

HAMED AL GHAITHI: Okay. Actually that was my last question until you mentioned the election, Israeli election. Two days ago, I read in the news that Prime Minister Netanyahu requested — filed for formal pardon from the Israeli president. And I think of this in relation to next year's election in Israel. So let's suppose he's pardoned and he's not prosecuted by the Israeli public prosecution and in court. What do you see the bearings on the coming election? And I think personally, I think that Netanyahu is a very skillful player, but his positioning within the Israeli politics, aligning with the extreme right — if he's pardoned, do you think he'll come to the center? To enable what you just mentioned, like all these hopes? Or just like the Israeli politics will be fractured and run and based on identity, which makes Israel hard to deal with in the region?

AMOS YADLIN: Israeli politics is much more complex than the Middle East. So I'm not an expert on Israeli politics. And we leave this question for another podcast.

CLOSING

HAMED AL GHAITHI: Okay. Well, we have a promise from you to join me in the future. General Yadlin, thank you a lot. It was an honor to meet you here in Fletcher, and we had longer conversations here in Fletcher than this one. But thank you, I appreciate joining the show.

AMOS YADLIN: Have a nice day. It was a pleasure being with you. Thank you for inviting me.

HAMED AL GHAITHI: Pleasure. Pleasure's mine. Have a good day.